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trial that the certificate is not such as falls within the terms of the Act. How-
ever, in Casto v. Wrenn, 255 Mass. 72, 150 N.E. 898 (1926), the court refused
to apply the Act, because there was no proof offered that the issuing corporation
was organized in a state where the Act was in force, although the Act was in
effect in Massachusetts, the situs of the certificates at the time of their transfer.
Norman v. Bancroft Trust Co., 55 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 1st, 1932), is to the same
effect.
It has been uniformly held that title to certificates of stock is governed by
the law of the situs of the certificates at the time of their transfer. Direction
Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22, 69 L.ed.
495 (1925). Therefore, if the Act is not in effect at such situs it cannot be
applied even though such Act was in effect in the state of the domicile of the
issuing corporation. However, a recent text writer proposes that if the Act is
in force at the domicile of the issuing corporation, the certificates of the
corporation are entitled to the benefits of the Act wherever they are
negotiated. CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) 118. See also RESTATE-
mENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 53 (d). There is, however, nothing in the Act that
lends its support to this holding and no case on the point can be found. It is
submitted that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act fails to recognize the needs of
modern business. It seems that the statute should be such as to apply to all
transfers within the state, so that its inhabitants may determine by local law
the validity of transfers made within the state without regard to the law of the
state of issue. It seems harsh, for instance, to require a broker, who takes part,
every day, in many transactions on the stock market involving many corpora-
tions of different states, to look to the laws of each state of incorporation to
see if a transfer was effected.
EDWARD J. SoTLOcK.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILIGED CoMmuNIcATioNs-PHYscIAN AND PATIENT-MEDICAL
ASSISTANTS AND DOCTRINE OF AGENcY.-The action was brought by the plaintiff
insurance company to cancel a life insurance policy issued by it on the life of
the deceased insured and payable to the defendant beneficiary. The insured died
a month and three days after the policy was issued and approximately fifteen
months after his admission to the Milwaukee County Hospital. Under the terms
of the policy, it was not to become effective if at the date of issuance the
insured was not in sound health. The plaintiff company contended the insured
deceased was not in sound health as required and, thus, the policy never became
effective. The defendant beneficiary counterclaimed for recovery on the policy.
The trial court, over the objection of the defendant beneficiary, admitted in
evidence the testimony of a nurse in the employ of the hospital, and a medical
case record of the deceased insured kept by the nurse and used by the physician
in treating the patient. Over objection, the trial court also admitted the testimony
of an X-ray operator in the employ of the hospital, and an X-ray plate made by
him at the direction of the physician. The evidence conclusively proved that the
deceased insured had been suffering from an incurable heart ailment at the
time the policy was issued. Subsequently, however, the trial court rejected the
evidence and entered judgment dismissing the complaint and awarding recovery to
the defendant on the counterclaim. The trial court held that all the evidence as
to the deceased insured's unsound health was given or based upon the testimony
of witnesses who were incompetent to testify under a statute disqualifying
a physician from disclosing "any information he may have acquired in attend-;
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ing any patient in a professional character necessary to enable him professionally
to serve such patient .. " [WIs. STAT. (1937) § 325.21]. On appeal by the
plaintiff company, held, evidence admissible and judgment reversed in favor of
the plaintiff company. The statute applies only to physicians and surgeons and
will not be extended beyond its letter to disqualify directly nurses and techni-
cians, or indirectly by the doctrine of medical agency. Prudential Life Insurance
Co. of Anterica v. Kozlowski, (Wis. 1937) 276 N.W. 301.
At common law, communications between physician and patient were not
privileged. 5 WIGzioaE, EVIDENCE (2 ed. 1923) §§ 2380-2383. In 1928, therefore,
New York granted the privilege by statutory enactment, and other jurisdictions
quickly adopted an identical or a similar statute. In 1839, Wisconsin enacted a
privilege statute using the New York law as a model. (WiscoNsiN ANNOTA-
TiONS, 1930) Based upon a sound philosophy of public welfare and public policy,
the statute was designed and intended to prevent disclosure of diseases or
uncleanly or vicious habits which are necessary for the physician to know in
order to treat the patient successfully, but which the patient might refrain from
disclosing to the physician if the latter could be compelled to disclose them.
Boyle v. Northwestern Mutual Reserve Ass'n., 95 Wis. 312, 70 N.W. 351 (1897) ;
Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 359, 178 N.W. 749, 752, 15 A.L.R.
1536 (1920). The judicial and legislative history of the statute discloses, how-
ever, that the law which was intended to be a shield became a sword and was
used to suppress rather than to reveal truth and to obstruct rather than to pro-
mote justice. (See dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Owen in Maine v. Mary-
land, supra.) Consequently, the statute has been amended frequently and lib-
eralized to express its true intent and to prevent gross injustice by its letter.
Estate of Gallun, 215 Wis. 314, 320, 254 N.W. 542 (1934). Thus, while there have
been many adjudications under the Wisconsin statute, the effect of the decisions
has been changed or modified by subsequent amendments to the law. Since the
statute is- in derogation of or limits the common law rule expressed above, it
has been strictly construed in its interpretation. Thus, an unlicensed practitioner
is not within the privilege granted by the statute, Wiel v. Cowles, (N.Y. 1887)
47 Hun. 307; nor a physician licensed to practice in another state but not in
Colorado, Head Camp P. 1. W. W. v. Loeher, 17 Col. App. 247, 68 Pac. 136
(1902) ; nor are the following professional groups within the privileges of the
statute: an osteopath, Hayden v. State, 81 Miss. 291, 33 So. 653 (1903) ; a chiro-
practor, Kress and Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650, 68 A.L.R. 167
(1930); a druggist, Deutschnmann v. Third Avenue R. Co., 87 App. Div. 503,
508, 84 N.Y. Supp. 887 (1903); a dentist, People v. DeFrance, 104 Mich. 563,
62 N.W. 709, 28 L.R.A. 139 (1895) ; Fleckinger v. Fischer, 119 Mo. 244, 24 S.W.
167, 22 L.R.A. 799 (1893); a veterinary surgeon, Hendershot v. Western Union
Teleg. Co., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N.W. 828 (1898) ; an orthopedist, William Laurie
Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014, 92 N.E. 337 (1910); Christian
Science practitioners, In re Mossman's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 404, 6 P. (2d) 576
(1931) ; public health nurses, Wills v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 28
Ohio App. 497, 162 N.E. 822 (1928) ; ambulance attendants, Springer v. Byram,
137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361, 23 L.R.A. 244 (1894) ; nurses and internes, Southwest
Metals Co. v. Gomes, 4 F. (2d) 215, 39 A.L.R. 1416 (C.C.A. 9th, 1925); Hobbs
v. Hulk'nan, 188 App. Div. 983, 117 N.Y. Supp. 917 (1919) ; Cleveland v. Maddox,
152 Ark. 538, 239 S.W. 370 (1922). In Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
191 Wis. 239, 210 N.W. 829, 830 (1926), it was held that testimony of an
interne, a nurse or an attendant was not barred because they are not physicians
with the meaning of the statute.
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RECENT DECISIONS...
While it is clear that the statute is strictly constructed, a conflict of author-
ity exists in the jurisdictions as to the competency of nurses, technicians, and
other third parties to testify under the statute when the doctrine of agency is
applicable to the circumstances of the case. Hence, some courts hold informa-
tion inadmissible when obtained by third party medical assistants while under
the direction, of a physician for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the
patient. In Culver v. Union Pacific R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924),
it was held that a professional nurse, assisting a physician to whom confidential
communications have been made by a patient, stands in the same relation of
confidence to the patient and may not be permitted to testify to such communi-
cations unless the privilege has been waived by the patient. This medical assist-
ant agency rule is followed by Meyer v. Russell, 55 N.D. 546, 214 N.W. 857
(1927) ; Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483
(1932). In Hogan v. Bateman Contracting Co., 184 Ark. 842, 43 S.W. (2d) 721
(1931), it was held that a notary public who typed the patient's statement to
the physician was incompetent to testify as to the contents thereof for to do
so would be an evasion of the statute. A visiting physician called into consulta-
tion by the attending physician, but who takes no part in the examination of
the patient and does not prescribe is precluded, nevertheless, from disclosing any
information without the consent of the patient. Green v. Town of Nebagainain,
113 Wis. 508, 89 N.W. 520 (1902); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Denting, 123
Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86, 375 (1890) ; Note (1908) 16 L.R.A. (N.s.) 888. The con-
trary rule rejecting the third party medical agency doctrine is stated in South-
west Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F. (2d) 215, 39 A.L.R. 1416 (C.C.A. 9th, 1925),
which holds that the statute does not exclude -the -testimony of a nurse who was
present and assisting in the care of the patient under the direction of the
physician. In First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F.
(2d) 48 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935), an insurance case practically identical with the
main case, it was held that a Minnesota statute making communications between
physician and patient privileged did not extend to a hospital dietitian or to a
nurse as to render inadmissible their testimony as to medical treatment given
the deceased insured although given under the directions of the physician. In
the main case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the interest of the disclosure
of truth and in the furtherance of justice, expressly rejected the doctrine of
agency where third party medical assistants are involved and followed the last
two cases. While the Wisconsin statute must be complied with as to physicians
and surgeons because it expresses a public policy declared by the legislature,
the supreme court in the main case clearly and concisely states that "if the
disclosures to the physician be such as not to subject the patient to shame or
affect his reputation or social standing, there is no reason why the physician
should not disclose them, and there is sound reason why in the interest of
truth and justice he should be compelled to disclose them. The physician's
exemption from disclosure should in reason be limited to such disclosures as
would injure the patient's feelings or reputation." In view of the many changes
in the statute since its adoption, it will be interesting to note whether or not
the Wisconsin legislature in its wisdom will amend the statute to conform with
the opinion of the supreme court in the recent decision.
WILLIAM EDwARw TAAY.
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